| Outcome | Probability | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | 24h Change | Volume | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jerome Powell | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Philip Jefferson | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Michelle Bowman | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Christopher Waller | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Michael Barr | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Lisa Cook | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Stephen Miran | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| John Williams | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Beth Hammack | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Anna Paulson | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Lorie Logan | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Neel Kashkari | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
This market asks which individual(s), if any, will formally dissent from the FOMC policy decision at the April 2026 meeting. Dissent votes can signal internal disagreement about the Fed’s policy path and affect market and policy expectations.
The Federal Open Market Committee meets regularly to set U.S. monetary policy in support of the Fed’s dual mandate (maximum employment and stable prices). Historically, most meetings produce unanimous or near‑unanimous statements, but dissents occur when one or more officials publicly oppose the committee’s policy decision or language. The frequency and identity of dissenters often reflect macroeconomic conditions and debates over the appropriate pace of rate changes or balance sheet strategy.
Prediction market prices express collective expectations about which named official(s) will be listed as dissenters in the Fed’s official meeting statement. Use these prices as a real‑time signal of perceived disagreement risk, not as a definitive forecast.
Resolution is based on the names explicitly identified as dissenters in the official FOMC statement released at the conclusion of the April 2026 meeting; only dissents recorded in that official statement determine the outcome.
Eligible outcomes correspond to the individual FOMC participants who take part in the April 2026 policy vote as listed by the Federal Reserve (this typically includes Board governors and the Reserve Bank presidents who are voting members that meeting).
Dissents tend to surface during periods of strong debate over the policy stance (e.g., rapid inflation shifts, weak growth, or controversial tool choices). Some officials have more frequent dissent histories reflecting steady policy philosophies, while others rarely dissent.
A member may dissent if incoming data or new risks contradict their assessment of inflation or employment, if they disagree with the committee’s chosen pace of tightening/loosening, or if they object to the policy statement’s language about risks and the path forward.
No — only dissents explicitly listed in the official meeting statement determine this market’s result; subsequent commentary or minute disclosures do not retroactively alter the official vote record for resolution purposes.