| Outcome | Probability | Yes Bid | Yes Ask | 24h Change | Volume | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Above 80 | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Above 100 | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Above 140 | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Above 120 | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
| Above 60 | 0% | 0¢ | 0¢ | — | $0 | Trade → |
This market asks how many seats the Fidesz–KDNP coalition will win in the next Hungarian parliamentary election; outcomes determine control of the National Assembly and affect domestic and EU policy. It matters because seat counts determine whether the coalition can pass ordinary laws, constitutional changes, or maintain a supermajority.
Fidesz–KDNP is the long-standing governing alliance in Hungary, led by Fidesz and its junior partner KDNP; they have previously held large majorities under Hungary’s current electoral rules. Hungary uses a mixed electoral system with single-member districts and a compensatory national list; political dynamics include incumbency advantages, electoral district boundaries, media environment, and periodic tensions with the EU and international partners.
Market prices aggregate trader expectations about likely seat totals and update as new information arrives; they should be read as real-time indicators of perceived probabilities and not as definitive forecasts. Use prices alongside polls, district-level reporting, and institutional rules to interpret likely seat distributions.
The market will close according to the exchange’s rules and the event’s timeline; in practice markets tied to seat outcomes typically settle after official results are certified or when the market operator announces a close date. Check the market page for the exchange’s settlement and close-time announcements.
The National Assembly has 199 seats. A simple majority requires at least 100 seats, while a two-thirds supermajority requires at least 133 seats, which is relevant for constitutional amendments and certain high‑impact legislation.
Seats are allocated from single-member districts won outright plus compensatory national list seats that correct some disproportionality; the coalition’s national vote share interacts with district wins to produce final seat totals, so strong district-level performance can yield a larger seat share than national vote percentages alone would suggest.
Unified opposition lists or coordinated single-member district strategies reduce vote-splitting, increasing the chance of defeating incumbents in tight districts and altering the compensatory seat distribution, which can materially change Fidesz–KDNP’s final seat count compared with a fragmented opposition.
District-level polling releases, official candidate registrations, major campaign events, scandals, coalition agreements or withdrawals, unexpected economic indicators, and authoritative exit polls or early returns on election day are the most likely to shift market assessments.